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Does trade cause institutional change? Evidence from





Does trade improve institutions? Theoretically, the effect can go either way: sectoral specialization
may undermine institutions, but increased market access improves them. To examine the effect empir-
ically, I exploit the 1967-1975 war-induced closing of the Suez channel as a quasi-natural experiment
for freight cost changes. A difference-in-difference analysis shows that countries south of the Suez
canal exported fewer products that rely on high-quality institutions when the canal was closed. This
suggests that institutions suffered from trade isolation.
Keywords: institutions, trade, long run development, quasi-natural experiment
JEL-codes: O19; F63; N77; F11; F12; O43; F43
1 Introduction
In 1303, Edward I signed the Carta Mercatoria to protect foreign merchants, including the Hanseatic
league, under English law. The Carta Mercatoria limited trade duties and proposed "firm and im-
mutable" contracting, so that "neither merchant party to a contract can dispute it or back out of it." Ed-
ward was probably unaware of the trouble he caused his great-great grandson, Henry IV. By 1447, Lon-
don merchants were powerful enough to protest the legal status and trade privileges of their Hanseatic
competitors. Pressured, Henry IV revoked the concessions that his great-great grandfather granted to
the Hanse. The repeal of the concessions led to hijacking of ships and the plundering of the Hanseatic
trade offices in London, and eventually, naval war. English-Hanseatic trade required common con-
tracting and legal definitions, but the point of this example, and the point of this paper, is that trade
developments may also change those institutions.
The interest in institutional effects of trade is not only academic. Trade can have large indirect effects
on long-run development, by causing institutional change (Rodrik et al., 2004). In popular discourse,
international trade has two faces. Some consider market access, integration and easier capital mobil-
ity as key ingredients for long-run development. The "aid for trade" programmes pioneered by the
World Trade Organization advocate development through international trade, for instance by advo-
cating infrastructure investments. "Aid for trade" is now a mainstay of European Union development
programmes and finds support by organizations like the UN and the OECD (OECD/WTO, 2013). In
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the US, the United States Trade and Development Agency partners pairs the promotion of exports
with development aid. In 2013, the UK government concluded that "ultimately, trade is the most im-
portant driver of growth".1 On the other hand, others see dangers of trade flows and multinationals
entering poorer countries. Exposure to the larger world economy could prevent efficient government
interventions or erode democratic decision making (Stiglitz, 2003; Rodrik, 2011). Anti-globalization lob-
bies point to lack of development effects and incompatability of growth programmes with local context
(e.g., Bhagwati, 2002; Scott, 1997); and many NGOs oppose the trade-advocating programmes that they
consider unethical (Oxfam amongst others).
History provides plenty of examples to suggest that international trade can fortify institutions. Free-
ing up to trade has improved contract enforcement, increased the accountability of trade partners, or
restricted powerful elites. Puga and Trefler (2014) show that the growth of long-distance trade enabled
Venetian merchants to constrain the Doge. The access to trading routes to the East empowered mer-
chants to set up a parliament and improve contracting institutions. Greif (1989) shows how trade in the
Mediterranean encouraged traders to set up institutions to deal with distant trade partners. In Europe,
rising trade and the desire to protect non-local merchants’ interests led to improved property rights for-
mulated in Merchant Law (Greif et al., 1994). Acemoglu et al. (2005) contend that merchants’ increased
wealth derived from Atlantic trade was crucial in limiting European monarchical power, at least in
those countries where trade benefited merchants more than monarchs. Jha (2013) argues that medieval
Muslim long-distance shipping to India initiated institutions to trade across Muslim and Hindu ethnic
groups, and shows that these institutions persist to reduce conflict in Indian cities today.
More recent empirical results lean towards beneficial institutional effects of trade, although the ev-
idence is mixed. Trade and law enforcement correlate (Ades and di Tella, 1999), but it is difficult to
establish whether trade improves institutions, or vice versa. The causality is unclear, because institu-
tions like property rights and financing constructions also cultivate trade (de Groot et al., 2004; Nunn
and Trefler, 2013), or there may be a cause that explains both. Exploiting variation from physical geog-
raphy between countries (Frankel and Romer, 1999), Rodrik et al. (2004) find that trade openness causes
better institutions. However, using the same instrument, Levchenko (2013) shows that trade may lead
to poorer institutions if it occurs in sectors that are less sensitive to good institutions. Moreover, the
geography between countries (e.g. distance) might correlate to alternative explanations like shared his-
tory or information flows; and it might have little explanatory power over and above local geography
(Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001; Irwin and Tervio, 2002). Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) and Tavares (2007)
show that episodes of trade liberalization are associated with better institutions, but it is hard to exclude
that trade follows (or anticipates) good institutions, or that economic development or political change
improves both.
This paper shows that theoretically, international trade can improve institutions, but will not nec-
essarily do so. Earlier results suggest that trade erodes institutions in less developed countries. When
trading with institutionally advanced countries, lagging countries specialize in industries that are less
institutionally intense, increasing the local demand for easy expropriation. By incorporating a compar-
ative advantage motive for trade, this paper obtains similar results. In this sense, my paper is mostly
related to Levchenko (2007). It also follows the conjecture of Nunn and Trefler (2013) that compara-
tive advantage (rather than trade openness per se) explains institutional quality. However, this paper
explores the effects of the overall size of the trade flow as well. In the theoretical illustration below,
entrepreneurs need up front, expropriable investments to produce. Poorer institutions lead to larger
obstacles in attracting production factors, raising factor prices. The ensuing increase in the final goods
price leads to lower sales. The disciplining effect of lost sales becomes stronger when access to foreign
1Secretary of State for International Development Greening in July, 2013 (see https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/justine-
greening-global-trade-can-help-us-end-the-need-for-aid).
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markets is easier, in which case lowering prices yields larger revenues. As a result, trade liberalization
could push all firms to demand better property rights, to prevent inducing risk premia that hamper
sales. This beneficial channel could counter the negative, sectoral effects. While comparable arguments
have been made implicitly in the public debate, this paper is among the first to formalize such a benefi-
cial channel. Do and Levchenko (2009) follow a related argument, but they compare poorer institutions
to higher entry costs. Productive, larger firms prefer higher levels of entry costs, and trade liberaliza-
tion may improve or worsen institutions, depending on how it affects the share of largest firms. Dixit
(2003) similarly, but inversely, shows that larger markets require more formal property rights for en-
forcement.2
This paper documents that export growth following trade isolation is lower for the sectors that de-
pend on institutions. The sectoral dependence on institutions follows Nunn (2007), who shows that
contract enforcement is a source of comparative advantage. The approach of the current paper was in-
spired by an essay of Fernando Ortíz of 1940, explaining how on Cuba, the production of tobacco takes
time but little manpower, whereas sugar grows fast and is harvested at great scale using laborers inten-
sively. The productionmethod differences caused tobacco to be "liberal, not to say revolutionary", while
sugar is "conservative, if not reactionary".3 This paper exploits sector differences in institutional sen-
sitivity only for identification. It is related to literature that traces long-run development from sectoral
structure although it is less ambitious (in that this paper only looks at institutions, not overall devel-
opment). Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) argue that sectoral and institutional developments are linked
historically: in countries suited to sectors with scale-intensive production, like sugar or cotton, colo-
nizers developed larger inequalities and less inclusive institutions as a result. Countries that fostered
smaller scale production (like grains), like the U.S. and Canada, saw institutions that enabled faster
long-run development. In the same vein, Bruhn and Gallego (2012) show that long-run development
coincides with historical regional specialization into constant-return and increasing-return sectors. Dip-
pel et al. (2015) document that falling sugar prices reduced the coercive power of plantation owners in
the 19th century British Carribean. Mayshar et al. (2015) similarly show that soil suitability for stor-
able crops generates demand for protection from expropriation, because storable crops are most easily
expropriated.
To contribute to the debate whether trade causes institutional change, I exploit the closing of the Suez
canal as an exogenous shock to trade openness and examine its effect on sectoral export patterns. An
Egyptian-Israeli war closed off the Suez canal completely, cutting off countries behind the Suez canal
from a quick route into the Mediterranean - the experiment was proposed by Feyrer (2009). In the three
years before and after the canal shutdown, there are substantial trade adjustments. The export of beef,
which requires large up front investments, grew around 15% slower in countries whose shortest route
was through the Suez canal, compared to other countries. The export of hogs, by contrast, requires
far less up front investments. In countries south of the Suez canal, exports of pork grew around 37%
faster than elsewhere. The approach of comparing the trade shock in different sectoral exports, echoing
Rajan and Zingales (1998), uses an indirect measure of institutions. Yet, it yields two merits. First,
the analysis does not rely on institutional indexes, which are available for limited time frames only.
In particular, it allows exploiting a quasi-experiment at a time and place where institutions were not
quantified: African countries behind the Suez canal did not anticipate, let alone influence the closing of
this canal. Second, comparing between sectors in the same country allows ruling out many country-
level confounding effects like recessions, political responses or exchange rate developments. Ruling out
alternative explanations, the analysis complements attempts to establish causal effects of trade through
2Some other papers suggest that skill demand developments induced by trade liberalization change the rate of expropriation
(Ghosh and Robertson, 2012), and that trade may draw away labor from conflicts that require labor (dal Bó and dal Bó, 2011).
3As quoted in Tom Miller’s "Trading with the Enemy".
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cross-country instrumental variable evidence and difference-in-difference evidence.
The results suggest that closing down trade hurts domestic institutional quality. Conversely, open-
ing up the Suez canal expanded export sectors in Eastern Africa that rely on institutions intensively.
This holds for different definitions of institutional intensity. I also find modest evidence for shifts away
from capital-intensive sectors in Eastern African countries when trade costs are lower. This points to
comparative advantage dynamics, which do not reverse the beneficial institutional effects of trade.
The next section develops the theoretical argument in which institutional quality in the outcome
of a political process. Its main point is that comparative advantage forces may produce a detrimental
institutional effect of trade liberalization, but an incentive to avoid the high production costs associated
with poor institutions can overturn the detrimental effects. Section 3 presents the data, examines the
trade shock, and the empirical results. Section four concludes.
2 Theoretical motivation
This section develops a model of international trade, in which property rights are endogenously de-
termined through interest groups. The main idea in the model is that trade liberalization expands the
sectors that have prices that are low relative to world prices (i.e. in which the home country has a
comparative advantage). If this occurs in sectors that do not need good institutions, then the base of
bribers for poor institutions grows. On the other hand, as sectors are not perfectly competitive, lower
marginal costs better help exploit large market access. Lowmarginal costs, especially for attracting cap-
ital, depend on the quality of institutions. As a result, producers may put less effort into deteriorating
institutions when the economy is more open.
This model implies a tradeoff between potentially adverse specialization from trade liberalization,
and overall benefits from trade openness. The latter "enlightening" trade effect is novel. Related ar-
guments for adverse specialization have been made before. A difference in this paper is that the con-
tracting friction is in the up-front investment. That implies that factor prices for factors that can be
expropriated are not constant, but command risk premia.
The model of intersectoral international trade with imperfect competition builds on Helpman and
Krugman (1985) and Arnold (2013); and Bernard et al. (2007). The formulation of institutions follows
a Grossman-Moore-Hart formulation, as also studied in endogenous trade policy (Ornelas, 2005) and
endogenous institutions (Levchenko, 2007). In short, capital owners lose some of their capital in produc-
tion due to ill defined property rights, so capital is interpreted as the institution-intensive factor. Firms
owners have incentive to bribe policymakers into imperfect institutions. This section first discusses
the transaction between firms and suppliers of capital, which is interpreted as the institution-intensive
factor. The section subsequently develops an open-economy model.
2.1 Institutions and production factors
To consider the consequences of imperfect institutions, I allow for frictions when contracting a pro-
duction factor. In this case, capital owners supply a firm with capital, a catch-all term for production
factors that need to be transferred to the firm and are at risk of expropriation. In the following, the firm
needs to install some capital up front in its production process, making it relation–specific. The capital
may take the form of machines, but also of intellectual property or human capital. In essence, the firm
rationally expropriates as much of the capital as it can at the end of the production process, so capital
owners require a premium on returns. As the firm and the capital owner bargain over the surplus of
the investment, reducing the quality of contract enforcement may lower total capital costs for the firm,
but raise the marginal costs of using capital.
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Poor property rights imply that the firm can expropriate share φ (following the notation of Levchenko
(2007)) of the capital used in the fixed stage of production. A higher φ implies that contracting is more
difficult: the property rights over a larger share of capital cannot be established; or the contract cannot
be enforced easily. An important assumption here is that the capital involved in up-front investments
is more vulnerable to poor institutions than inputs in the variable stage of production. One justifica-
tion is that this capital is typically involved in the entire production process - the machines adapted
to a firm, the payments for buildings, or the knowledge embodied in human capital are required be-
fore revenue enters the firm’s accounts. Moreover, inputs involved in the variable stage of production
(inputs required for each product, assembly) can be withdrawn for subsequent units if the firm renego-
tiates the contract. Thus, punishment strategies may be more feasible for inputs in the variable stage of
production.
To agree on the transfer of capital, a firm and a capital supplier bargain over a rate of return r on
capital. The firm is able to expropriate share φ of the up-front (fixed) stage capital. The cost of capital
for the firm are kqr+ k f r (1  φ), where kq refers is the capital used in the variable stage of production
and k f is the capital used in the fixed stage; kq and k f sum up to k. The alternative option for the firm is
to write a fully specified contract, which commits the firm to not expropriating. Writing the contract is
costly, however, because it requires full documentation and contingency planning. As a result, the cost
of attracting a unit of capital is higher under full contracting: r¯ > r (or the costs of perfect contracting
are prohibitive in equilibrium). For the supplier, the returns are the agreed return over the total capital
stock, kr, but φk f will be expropriated with certainty. The alternative option for the supplier is a risk-
adjusted investment return elsewhere in the economy. I assume that the return on the capital supplier’s
outside option r falls in the overall quality of contracting φ, because poor contracting reduces the risk-
adjusted return (or the demand for risk-free investment rises, reducing the risk-free return). The outside
option needs to pay off less than the contract: r > r (the supplier’s participation constraint). The firm
and capital supplier Nash-bargain over the surplus, as is convention (see, e.g. Maskin and Tirole, 1999).
In equilibrium, the surplus from the transaction is equally shared, so the contract return solves that the
surplus of the firm and capital supplier are equal:
 (kqr+ k f r (1  φ)  kr¯) = kr  φk f r  kr (φ) , (1)
where the left-hand side is (the negative of) the firm ’s total cost under the transaction less the total costs
of perfect contracting; the right-hand side is the supplier’s revenue less the revenue from an outside
option.




(r (φ) + r¯)
1  φk f/k . (2)
If there were no expropriation (φ = 0), the equilibrium return would be the average of the firm’s
and supplier’s outside options. Poor contracting, however, increases the price capital, because the
supplier requires compensation for the expected expropriation. That compensation is larger, if the share
of capital used in the fixed stage of production is larger. At the same time, poorer contracting reduces
the alternative, risk-adjusted return for the capital supplier. As a result, the required return falls. The
increased expropriation is thus countered with worsening outside options for the capital supplier, so














Poorer institutions may depress capital returns if the value of the investor outside option declines faster
than the risk premium rises. For the purpose of the analysis, I assume that the risk-premium effect
dominates (which also seems sensible if the outside option is a weighted average of returns across the
economy). Theoretically, the results can be reversed if poorer institutions reduce equilibrium capital
returns - in that case, bad contract enforcement is a comparative advantage because it lowers marginal
costs.




. For a given level of capital, a change in the
quality of institutions, φ, has two effects on total costs: it increases the share of capital expropriated and
thus not being paid for; and it raises the equilibrium return on capital. Differentiating the total costs











The total costs for the firm are lower if contract enforcement is poorer. The expropriation is foreseen and
factored into the price of capital. However, as the outside option for the capital supplier deteriorates,
he secures less of the surplus of the transaction, and the total costs for the firm fall.
The imperfect contract in this model effectively requires a relation-specific investment, as the capital
supplier realizes a share of his initial capital is not retrievable. In that sense, there is a parallel with
other property rights models (Aghion et al., 2004; Noeldeke and Schmidt, 1998). Maskin and Tirole
(1999) show that the contracting problem is much like bilateral monopoly models (Hart and Moore,
1988), where a hold up situation emerges from the partner-specific investments. The essence of the ar-
gument is that the incomplete enforcement of contracts yields an advantage for the firm that has hold
of the institution-intensive capital. In the trade model below, there is a second distortion (monopolistic
competition) which raises output prices. The contracting imperfection leads to a transfer (the expropri-
able part of capital) and a capital return distortion. As long as the capital returns are increased by the
contracting friction, they will reinforce the monopolistic price distortion, so the imperfect contracts are
likely to reduce welfare.4
2.2 The trade model
To study how international trade can change institutions, I embed the problems that arise with imper-
fect contracting in a small country opening up to world trade. There are many sectors and each sector
is populated with many firms.
Imperfect competition helps to explain two questions that a model of perfect competition cannot.
First, even in African agriculture, there are substantial markups (especially for risky crops, see discus-
sion below) and fixed costs. These cannot be consistently adressed in most perfect competition frame-
works. Second, a framework with fixed costs may be more informative of institutional developments
than marginal costs. The reason is that when trade costs change, marginal costs may reflect institu-
tional risk in the factor market, but the implied output price change reflect also Stolper-Samuelson
movements. Fixed costs do not end up in the relative output price.5
Firms use labor (l), capital (k) and sector-specific resources e. The sector-specific resources can be
4In the theoretical case where poor contract enforcement depresses capital returns, poor institutions may effectively bring
output prices closer to the optimal price. In that case, imperfect enforcement can be part of a second-best solution.
5In a perfectly competitive setting, one could introduce bargaining over the capital returns, where all capital is expropriable




r (φ) + r¯
1+ φ
instead of (2). This leads to similar results but assumes away a role for fixed costs.
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thought of as land (expressed in productivity terms), natural advantages or infrastructure specific to a
sector. The production function is q = q (l, k, e). The price of labor, capital and the sector-specific factor
are w, r, and ρ, respectively. All production factors are necessary but have decreasing returns.6 The
country’s endowment of the sector-specific production factor is Ez. With nz symmetric firms operating
in sector z, the use of the endowment per firm is Ez/nz. The equilibrium price of the sector-specific
factor is determined by its inverse use: ρ = ρ (nz/Ez). Firms and capital suppliers negotiate the return
on capital rz. Labor is mobile across sectors, and wages equalize across sectors. To pin down the
equilibrium, I take the wage rate as numéraire, w = 1.
The marginal costs of the firms depend on the price of the endowment, capital returns, and the tech-
nology of the sector: mcz = mcz (rz, nz/Ez). If capital rates rise, so do the marginal costs of production.
The capital intensity of (marginal) production is higher, if the marginal costs of production rise faster
with capital prices (higher dmcz/drz indicates higher capital intensity).
Consumers view goodswithin a sector as imperfect substitutes. The preference over different sectors
is unit-elastic. The consumers’ utility function is:
U =
Z






where bz is effectively the budget share for industry z, and i indexes individual firms. For a representa-







where y denotes the income and the bar over p indicates delivered prices. For further reference, I use






. Facing the iso-elastic demand




Output prices are proportional to marginal costs. When shipping to a foreign country, the firm faces
iceberg transport costs: it needs to ship τ units for one unit to arrive. Under constant elasticity of
demand, the firm charges a premium for the trade costs to foreign consumers, so the delivered price in
a foreign country is p¯ = σσ 1τmcz.
In equilibrium, firms export to the foreign country from the small home country. The firm’s profit
function consists of revenue less costs for all production factors and any political contributions the




  TKCi   ρzei   li  ω. (6)
Firms enter as long as the profits are positive, increasing the number of firms in sector z. In equilibrium,
pii = 0 and dpiz/dnz < 0.
The trading equilibrium is further determined by four other equilibrium conditions: the markets for
labor, endowments, and capital clear, and trade with the outside world is balanced. Equilibria of this
type are discussed in Helpman and Krugman (1985, chapter 7) and Arnold (2013). The most notable
difference is that in my framework, the Inada conditions on the sector-specific production factor ensure
that firms in a specific sector become extremely productive if their number tends to zero. As a result,
6I.e. dq/dx > 0; d2q/dx2 < 0; limx!0+ dq (x, x  > 0) /dx ! ∞; where x is k, l, e and x  are the production factors not x.
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all sectors are active, whereas in the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin world with imperfect competition,
countries may specialize fully into a subset of sectors. This resembles the Bernard et al. (2007) model of
comparative advantage with heterogeneous firms, where very productive firms are able to survive in
comparative disadvantage sectors. Mechanically, the models are similar in this prediction, except the
the motivation in the current model is Ricardian.
2.3 Politics
The level of institutional quality is determined by a policy maker. I assume that the beneficiaries of
poor property rights can send political contributions to the policymaker to make him change the level
of contract enforcement. I follow Levchenko (2007) in assuming that there is a single policymaker that
is sensitive to political bribes. The policymaker has a desire to minimize losses to social welfare, which
could be motivated by electoral or ethical reasons. The policymaker uses the political contributions to
finance private consumption of foreign goods. An alternative interpretation of the policymaker could
be a political elite. Its motivation to maintain welfare could be to avoid unrest or forceful threats to the
elite (as underlies the coup or conflict models in, e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). The theory below
does not consider repressive politics, however, so the latter interpretation is less intimately linked to the
theory.
The policymaker of the country has two objectives: political contributions (or bribes), and social
welfare. The relative weight λ determines howmuch funds are needed tomake the policymaker worsen
contract enforcement. That susceptibility to bribes λ can be interpreted as the elite’s preferences or the
constitutional environment, for instance. Weaker contract enforcement, as argued above, is generally
harmful to social welfare. Using S to denote welfare andΩ to denote the sum of political contributions,
the political objective function is:
G = λS (φ) + (1  λ)Ω (7)
If λ = 1, the policymaker is perfectly benevolent. If λ is smaller than 1, the policymaker is increasingly
corrupt. I assume that the policymaker can can freely choose the quality of property rights (i.e. no
explicit law enforcement sector is modeled) - bribes are the only reason to prevent him from developing
optimal institutions (for which dS/dφ = 0).









The social costs of deteriorating institutions poor institutions weigh against the benefits of political
contributions. The rate at which the marginal social costs are weighed against financial contributions
is higher if the policymaker is less corrupt (λ is higher). The degree to which the policymaker permits
expropriation by firms is simply determined by the amount of contributions he receives, so (8) provides
a measure of the institutional quality. Consequently, the effects of trade liberalization on property rights
are determined by how trade liberalization changes the incentive to bribe the policymakers.
It is left to determine how firms decide on the level of their contributions. I assume that firms have
common lobbies influence to policymaker. As individual firms are atomistically small, their individual
contributions have ignorable effects on the policymaker’s decisions. It is important to note that firms
have no such monopolistic power in output market. This assumption seems sensible when the country
is small - there is no collusion with firms of the same nationality on the world market.7
Firms bribe to establish their preferred quality of institutions, realizing that their preferred quality
of institutions implies a specific contribution. Maximizing the profit function with respect to the level
7If the country is large, strategic behavior on the world market substantially complicates the model.
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of institutions, the first-order condition is:
dω
dφ






where R = (p/P)1 σ bzY is the firm’s revenue. The left-hand side of this first-order condition is the
change in required contributions when the level of contract enforcement changes. The right-hand side
of this first-order condition is the net effect on sales less factor costs. It is the balance of two effects. First,
poorer institutions increase the marginal costs, thus reducing sales (σ > 1). This effect is weighed by the
capital intensity of production (the degree to which capital price increases imply higher marginal costs,
dmcz/drz). Second, as shown above, poorer contract enforcement reduce total costs for capital, which
benefits the firm. In both cases, the benefits in terms of profits are lower for firms that have higher fixed
capital requirements: their marginal costs rise faster and their total capital costs reduce less quickly
when institutions deteriorate. Summarizing, the willingness to bribe dω/dφ is lower for industries that
face larger fixed costs, and for capital intensive firms, assuming that poor contract enforcement raises
marginal costs.
2.4 The institutional effects of trade liberalization
The effects of trade liberalization in this trade model are best summarized as two forces: market access
grows and comparatively advantaged industries grow. The two forces have opposing effects on the
firms that send contributions.
The total political contributions Ω can be split into sectoral parts: Ω = Σznzωz, where ωz is the
profit-maximizing contribution of a typical firm in sector z. The change in institutions φ leads to changes
















From the policymaker’s first-order condition (8), expression (10) equals the violations of social welfare
due to imperfect contract enforcement. Whether the policymaker improves contract enforcement after
trade liberalization depends on how trade liberalization affects the profits of firms paying the contri-
butions. Since the left-hand side of (10) is a direct measure of the (lack of) contract enforcement, the
effect of trade costs on institutions is its cross-derivative with respect to trade costs: d2Ω/ (dφdτ). The
derivation of this effect is delegated to the analytical Appendix. However, the intuition for the force



















The first effect in the bribe sensitivity to trade costs (11) suggests that trade liberalization improves
institutions. Poor institutions raise marginal costs in any industry, so dmc/dφ is positive in any case. A
decrease in trade costs increases revenue R, because market access improves. In that case, having high
marginal costs is penalized further: the benefits of expropriation now need to compensate an increased
loss of sales revenue following high output prices.
The second effect in (11) comprises two comparative advantage forces. Some industries expand in
firm numbers with trade liberalization. Firms in different sectors prefer different levels of institutional
quality, so sectoral reallocation changes the demand for low-quality institutions. If the correlation be-
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tween dnz/dτ and dωz/dφ is negative, the sectoral reallocation effect yields poorer institutions. In
particular, as industries with lower fixed costs prefer easier expropriation, trade liberalization might
deteriorate the institutions in countries where institutions are poorer than elsewhere. The sectoral ex-
pansion (dnz/dτ) is further detailed in the analytical Appendix. This mechanism is parallel to the one
outlined in Levchenko (2007). There is an effect on capital use of firms within sectors, too. This is
captured in dTKCidφ nz
dki/dτ
ki
. Trade liberalization causes Rybczynski capital intensity changes (dki/dτ)
at the firm level i. Whether these fall to high-quality or low-quality demanding sectors, determines
whether the demand for good institutions rises. It is not clear-cut whether trade liberalization actually
expands low- or high fixed costs sectors: that is determined by overall capital intensity, not fixed cap-
ital investments. A positive correlation between capital intensity and upfront costs could reinforce the
comparative advantage effects on institutions: then, a labor-abundant economy sees expansion in the
sectors with low upfront costs after trade liberalization.
The trade model with imperfect competition thus predicts that the institutional effect of trade lib-
eralization is the sum of two (opposing) forces. Firstly, trade liberalization enlarges the market, and
in a larger market, low marginal costs are important. Thus, easier goods trade provides an incentive
to get rid of institutional factors that drive up factor prices. On the other hand, trade liberalization
may cause countries to specialize in their comparative advantage industries. In a country with poor
institutions and abundant labor, those might be the industries that thrive with poorer institutions: trade
liberalization could mean an extra barrier to high levels of contract enforcement.
2.5 To the data
The above discussionmotivates the empirical analysis. Themodel suggests that sectoral exports change
directly with a trade cost shock through the costs of supplying foreign markets; and indirecly through












The export equation is a standard "gravity" prediction obtained from aggregating individual demand
(eq. 4). The direct effect of trade cost changes on exports, ∂nzRz/∂τ, is determined by the price of the
sector’s good relative to the world price (which can depend on the quality of institutions). The indirect
effect is a product of a sector’s sensitivity to institutions (∂nzRz/∂φ) and the sensitivity of institutions
to trade openness, dφ/dτ. The empirical specification below exploits that differential sensitivity to
institutional quality; by checking whether the sectors that rely more on good institutions export more
or less during trade isolation.
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which uses the capital returns (3) and the inelasticity of entry (the derivation is in the analytical Appen-
dix). Poorer institutions reduce exports disproportionately in sectors where capital intensity is high,
and where up front capital comprises a large part of the required capital.
When looking at the effects of trade isolation on exports of sectors with different institutional inten-
sity, it is important to rule out the direct trade effects. The above equation excludes direct effects by
focusing on the interaction effects between institutional sensitivity and the trade shock. I also check
whether the interaction effect could be explained by alternative, correlated differential effects of char-
acteristics like average traded distance of the product, trade costs, or overall capital intensity. However,
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the sample offers a possibly more compelling argument. I assume that African countries in the 1960s
and 1970s had no comparative advantage in institutional quality and were not capital abundant. The
direct trade effect of trade isolation is to push African countries into sectors that do not rely on property
rights and capital. If isolation improved institutions indirectly, the direct and indirect effect might be
correlated (both predict growth in institutionally sensitive industries during the closure of the canal).
Then the the trade effect might indistinguishable from the institutional effect. I find the opposite, how-
ever: trade patterns move opposite to what the direct channel predicts - institutionally sensitive sectors
decline with trade isolation. Thus, institutionally intense sectors decline, even though demand for their
products is higher.
3 Evidence from the closing of the Suez canal
The above discussion suggests that trade liberalization may cause opposing pressures on institutions.
On the one hand, access to international market is overall beneficial as producers demand better insti-
tutions. On the other hand, the potential specialization in industries that rely less on good institutions
may reduce the demand for high-quality institutions. This section evaluates the results empirically, de-
scribing the Suez canal as a "quasi-experiment" and discussing difference-in-difference evidence. The
background on the Suez canal is kept to a minimum; a more extensive description of the events that led
to the closing of the canal can be found in Feyrer (2009), who proposed the experiment.
It is important to understand, too, what the empirical model does not do. The above equations
aim to provide a consistent story of institutional change, but rely on a specific channel of institutional
change (through political contribution). The aim of this section is not to test that specific model, but to
understand the net institutional effects of trade in this sample.
In this section, I show that sectors that require larger upfront costs and thus require good institu-
tions, suffer more from trade isolation. This is not explained by the capital intensity of the sector or the
possibility that sectors with large upfront costs have a different sensitivity to trade costs. I also show
that, conditional on country fixed effects, institutionally weaker countries export less of the products
that require upfront costs. Finally, I show similar results for different measures of institutional sensitiv-
ity.
3.1 The Suez canal and context of the trade shock
The Suez canal was shut from 1967 to 1975. In 1955, after the Egyptian approachement to the Soviets, the
UK withdrew its financial support for the construction of the Aswan (high) dam and the US followed
the next year, in 1956. In response, the Egyptian president Nasser nationalized the Suez canal, earlier
held by the British, to finance the Aswan dam construction. To avert an Israeli (backed by the British
and French) dispute with Egypt, the United Nations passed the Pearson resolution in 1956. The Pearson
resolution left the Suez canal freely navigable under UN control. It was not until the Six Day war with
Israel that Egypt closed the canal again. During the Six Day war, Israeli forces took control of the Sinai
peninsula, leading the Suez canal to be a warfront. Egypt closed down the canal by sinking ships; and
by the end of the war a substantial amount of mines had been placed in the canal. The closure of the
canal was unexpected. In fact, a group of ships (the "Yellow Fleet") were caught in the canal after it had
been closed, only to be released in 1975. In 1973, the canal was once again the scene of war, this time of
the Yom Kippur war. By 1974, the UN had regained control over the Suez canal, but the wartime debris
and mines still left the canal innavigable. After clearing the canal, it was formally reopened on June 5th,
1975.
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The closing of the Suez canal poses a possible quasi-experiment for the countries south the Suez
canal. Egypt was clearly involved in the conflict that led to the closing of the canal, but many coastal
countries south of the canal were not involved in the conflict. Exporting many agricultural goods and
resources, these countries have had clear transport cost shocks while other freight costs (air transport)
remained fairly constant. Moreover, as argued in Feyrer (2009), the conflict broke out unexpectedly and
continued over the closing spell, so the change in transport costs was not anticipated or avoidable.
To proxy the change in transports costs, I exploit the change in kilometers of sea navigation required
for a set of African countries to reach a European port. For countries on the East coast of Africa, the
closing of the Suez canal implied a shipping route around the South Cape. For countries on the West
coast (that is, South Africa and countries located more West), shutting down the eastern route had
no consequences for the shortest path. To quantify these changes, I have taken sea route data from
searates.com (see Appendix), for shipping to the (then) largest part of Europe, Rotterdam. I compared
the length of the route in kilometers via the Suez canal, and the route via South Africa.8 The regres-
sions use only countries that have access to the ocean, because for land-locked countries like Zambia
or Uganda, it is uncertain whether the shortest route is affected. The Appendix provides a list of the
African countries in the sample; and which ports I took to be their main seaport. Figure 1 summarizes
the percentage change in shipping distance to Rotterdam. The mean distance to the port of Rotterdam
before 1967 was around 10,600 kilometers. For the affected countries, the mean distance increased from
10,400 kilometers to 14,900 kilometers.
The closing of the Suez canal had substantial effects on trade. Feyrer (2009) documents that the
closing of the Suez canal led to significant decreases in aggregate trade for country pairs whose quickest
route used the canal. Focusing on agricultural exports, mymain data, this picture is confirmed. Figure 2
traces the development of the (total) agricultural exports in my data for affected countries (for who the
shipping distances increased in 1967, on the eastern coast of Africa) and unaffected countries. Affected
countries show a drop in exports in 1967, moreover, high export growth experienced elsewhere on
the continent was absent of the East coast. A simple difference in difference regression of the log of
total exports on the interaction of dummies for being affected and for the years 1967-1975; and for
country and time fixed effects confirms this: the interaction term takes a coefficient -0.11, suggesting
that affected countries had 11% lower exports than could be expected if under the same circumstances
as the unaffected countries. It is less certain which transporters were most affected. British registered
ships traditionally account for the lion’s share of merchant shipping (Jeula, 1872); but by 1966, Liberian,
and Norwegian-registered ships took large portions too, due to the use of flags of convenience.9 The
British minister of Foreign office notes that from 1967 to 1968, the number of British ships calling at
South African ports tripled.
The canal closure affected trade relations, but not many other relations. Passenger travel from Eu-
rope to the African countries in the sample did not become much slower, and news and other infor-
mation is unlikely to be hampered by the barred searoutes. This reduces potential contamination of
the causal effects of trade with the other effects of economic integration, which often correlate with
distance, too.
The predictions of my model would be less likely to hold if there were no functioning (interna-
tional) markets, or if production was fully planned in the sample countries during the years of my
sample. However, there are several reasons to assume this is not a large problem. First, planning or
8The second route is the sum of two parts, shipping to South Africa, and subsequently shipping to Rotterdam. To infer the cost
of the stop in South Africa, I compared the kilometers shipping from Mozambique to Botswana, to the kilometers shipping from
Mozambique to South Africa to Botswana. The results do not change whether subtracting this "South Africa stopover" difference
from the imputed length of the southern route. I also used the shipment time, but as it is highly correlated to the kilometers, the
results do not change between using time or kilometers.
9The latter statistics stem from the leaflet "General Comparative Statistics: Panama and Suez Canals" that the Panama Canal
museum published in 1971.
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Figure 1: Shipping distance changes to Rotterdam (%) due to Suez channel closing by country
Figure 2: Evolution of agricultural trade for affected and non-affected countries
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absence of markets would imply absence of the trade effects that are central to the model. A test using
exports would thus be biased towards finding no conclusions, if trade were unresponsive to interna-
tional markets. Second, I find modest evidence that capita-intensive industries thrive with the closure
of the Suez canal - consistent with neoclassical trade theory. Third, while evidence is not abundant,
most of it suggests that more or less functioning markets were present, despite relatively many gov-
ernment interventions and occasional extreme outcomes following droughts. There is evidence that
workers choose to work in different industries according to pay and risk. Firing workers is not easy,
but wages do reflect human capital and urban premia in many parts of Africa (Boissiere et al., 1985).
Countries probably relied on tariffs and taxes on exporting industries, although that has not stopped
trade - with the exception of Somalia, exports to OECD countries grew in sub-Saharan Africa (Dercon,
1993; Collier, 1991; Rodrik, 1998). A possible explanation for the relative responsiveness is that most
African agricultural labour is flexible: workers often work several jobs - possibly to diversify sectoral
climatic risk (Davis et al., 2014; Reardon et al., 1992). Agriculture saw outside pressure from large ur-
banization movements for all decades in my sample, and rural areas likely provided competitive (i.e.
non-subsistence) alternative sectors of employment (Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 2001). Price controls were
largely ineffective (Collier and Gunning, 1999). Overall, tariffs and other interventions should there-
fore make comparative advantage patterns less pronounced, stacking against either hypothesis. As a
robustness check, Appendix E investigates the effect of price support on the findings.
It also seems plausible that many firms in Eastern Africa between the 1960s and the 1980s expe-
rienced contracting difficulties, as the model above assumes. Microevidence from that time is scarce,
but surveys dated later suggest that uncertainty about contracts is widespread. Bigsten et al. (2000)
show that for the several African countries they study (including Cameroon and Kenya), contracts are
renegable; court settlement functions imperfectly, and often, breaches of agreements are solved by ne-
gotiations outside court. Dercon (1998) argues that in Tanzania, risk and imperfect access to credit led
to sectoral allocation away from profitable sectors.
Furthermore, the identifying assumption in my baseline model requires that producers incur up
front costs and that these are not easily financable. This setup is borne out by several empirical results,
many in the overview of Collier and Gunning (1999). In Africa, the use of machinery differed from other
parts of the world. Yet, where manual labour falls short, animal power is used, if not machines. There
are exports from sectors that require planting (trees) on long term horizons, or investments in cattle and
livestock; and crops that require fallow land. African markets for capital and machinery are relatively
illiquid: few firms use second-hand equipment, and used capital goods sell at large discounts (Col-
lier and Gunning, 1999; Gunning and Pomp, 1995). There is significant uncertainty about land tenure
and operating rights, often mixing between formal entitlement and traditional tenure and heritability.
The uncertainty of the property status shows in lack of up front investments like tree crops (Besley,
1995). Uncertainty about land tenure often also leads to more labor intensive production strategies
(Fenske, 2011). Similarly, African farmers would spend windfalls in livestock investments, suggesting
their financing constrains are problematic (Dercon and Krishnan, 1996; Kinsey et al., 1998); and credit
constraint are prevalent across the whole economy (Bigsten et al., 2003). Together, these suggest that
some sectors are held back by the quality of contracting institutions.10
10Slavery might go against the assumption that labor is hired at "piece rate". While slavery may play a prominent role in the
(lack of) organization of inclusive institutions (e.g. the Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) argument), it is not obvious how it affects
this analysis of contract enforcement. In any case, slavery is not prevalent in the sample. Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia effectively
ended most slavery in 1935. The British and the Sultan of Zanzibar banned maritime slave trade in 1876, and the British banned
slavery inland after WW I. In Mozambique, one of the last colonies to become independent, forced labour was abolished in 1961.
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3.2 Empirical strategy
There are no direct measures for institutional quality in Africa in the 1960s. Instead, as suggested by
Nunn and Trefler (2013), I use the variation across different industries in the dependence on institu-
tions. To study the heterogeneous effects of transport costs, I use the variation in different agricultural
products.
The theoretical motivation suggests that sectoral exports are sensitive to changes in institutions:
the fixed costs involved in production make exports harder, if institutions deteriorate. The following
standard gravity equation allows for trade cost shocks specific to the cost structure of each sector:
















+ αit + µct + εict. (14)
The variable "distanceshockc " reflects the shipping distance in the time 1967-1975, which is higher





log (distancec) is zero for years in which the Suez canal was open.
The fixed effects αic and µct control for crop-country and country-time specific explanations of trade.
Following theory, countries may have different initial conditions and comparative advantages. The pat-
terns of comparative advantage may correlate with overall developments that could bias the estimate
of the canal closure effect, so they are absorbed in αic. Similarly, country-specific shocks that may or
may not be caused by institutional change, like a failed coup attempt (Kenya in 1978), the instatement
of a one-party system (Tanzania in 1977) or independence (Djibouti in 1977) could affect exports by
bringing about different economic policies or exchange rate management. Any correlation between the
trade shock and such national events is controlled for by the country-year fixed effects, as long as such
events do not systematically affect sectors differently.11 As the interaction arguments "logdistancec" and
"fixed costi" are collinear with the fixed effects µct and αit, their parameters β1 and β2 are not identified.
Effectively, this equation is a "dif-in-dif-in-dif" specification, because it compares the exports of different
products over transport costs differences over industries over time. However, the specification where
the shock is formulated in differences saves room in the specification.12
The regression is consistent with the export flow from the theoretical motivation (eq. 12). The
coefficient of interest in the regression is β4. Coefficient β4 shows how the exports of a specific com-
modity respond to the shock in transport costs, depending on whether that commodity relies heavily
on fixed costs of production. The comparison of different sectors in the same country allows ruling out
confounding explanations for the association between trade and institutions, like the fact that trade is
easier in institutionally advanced countries; that trade shocks cause political change; or that conflicts
11Many of the major political events do not coincide with the Suez closure: for most countries, independence occurs between
1940 and the early 1960s. In Mozambique, war starts in 1964 resulting in independence in 1975. Dropping Mozambique from
the sample does not change the results. Sub-Saharan African countries also saw waves of trade liberalizations, but they predom-
inantly took place in the 1980s.
12The alternative "diff-in-diff-in-diff" formulation would be:


































+ αic + µct + εict
where D(1967-1975) is a dummy indicating the years 1967 to 1975. The coefficient of interest is then β7, equal to β5 discussed
in the text.
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affect both trade and institutions. The approach is intuitively related to Rajan and Zingales (1998): if
trade improves institutions, then sectors that require good institutions decline when trade exogenously
stops. An important identifying assumption is that higher fixed or up front costs correspond to higher
institutional sensitivity. I explain this assumption in section 2 and motivate it empirically in Appendix
F. To check the robustness, I check that i) sectors with higher fixed costs indeed thrive in environments
with high-quality institutions and ii) that alternative definitions of institutional sensitivity show similar
results.
The sensitivity of different products to institutions is quantified using data on expenses from the
US Department of Agriculture in 1975 (or for some industries, the earliest possible date). The theoreti-
cal motivation suggests that exposed factors of production, like upfront investments and non-variable
stages, will be used less when contract enforcement is poor. The factors that can be hired "at the spot"
(e.g. day labour) face less of that exposure. To proxy the less institutionally sensitive factor employment,
I take the share of total costs that is classified as fixed costs of production from the USDA statistics for
individual crops and animals, assuming that products that rely heavily on variable stages of production
are institutionally less sensitive. Because the model also suggests comparative advantage arguments,
I also proxy capital employment by calculating the share of total costs due to non-land capital. The
assumption here is that characteristics of crops retain some similarity across locations. What offsets
cow farming from sugar production in American countries, also holds in African countries: the labor
costs in sugar production are higher than that in cow farming, while the capital and early-stage invest-
ment required for holding cows is far higher. Clearly, the relative price of capital or labor is not equal
between the economies, but country year (and crop) fixed effects controls for country-specific absolute
deviations in the factor prices. An overview of the product groups used from the USDA data, as well
as a crosswalk developed to match the export data is available in the Appendix.
The export data are from the FAO; they reflect data from the respective country to the entire world,
from 1960 to 1985. The focus on agricultural exports is not very restrictive, as mineral and agricultural
exports accounted for most of African exports in the sample years. There are no bilateral trade data for
this period. Earlier and later data suggest Europe is the largest destination by far.13
The estimation of this equation needs twomodifications from regular OLS. Firstly, around 60% of the
export flows are zero. This is not surprising, given that the data are effectively sectoral. Given the zero
trade flows, taking the log of exports would lead to a substantial, non-random loss of data. Instead,
I estimate the equation using the Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimator, which is consistent
and can deal with zero-valued flows in the logarithmic form (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). The standard
errors are robust. Secondly, the distance shock conditional on crop characteristics is not independent
across observations: countries are affected several years in a row, and several products have the same
characteristics (e.g., veal and beef are attributed the same capital intensity). Therefore I cluster the
standard errors for different product groups by country and spell (pre-treatment, during treatment,
post treatment).
3.3 Evidence from agricultural data
Table 1 presents the results of the main regressions. Most importantly, the coefficient on the interaction
between fixed cost shares and the trade cost shock is negative. The negative coefficient suggests that
sectors that require larger up-front investments were hurt significantly worse by the increased transport
costs than sectors in which costs are more associated to the variable stage of production. The estimate
implies that the average transport distance shock leads to around 40% lower export if a crop requires
13Estimates from Fouquin and Hugot (2016) suggest that in the 1960s, exports to Europe accounted for around 70% of African
exports, while exports to Asia at 7% and exports to other African countries 8% were much smaller. For Eastern African countries
(UN definition) Europe accounted for around 65% of the exports, Asia for around 12%.
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Table 1: Agricultural products: Effects on log exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre 1971 Post 1971 Placebo
Fixed cost share x shock log km -8.38** -8.45** -12.25*** -5.94*** -7.84**
(3.53) (3.69) (3.59) (2.30) (3.18)
Capital cost share x shock log km 17.19 154.17*** 5.11 24.59**
(11.26) (11.90) (16.38) (10.77)
Fixed cost share x placebo shock 7.96
(12.14)
Observations 9,714 9,714 9,714 3,553 6,484 9,204
Country-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-Crop FE yes yes yes yes yes
Crop-Year FE yes
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
one standard deviation (about 10% of total costs) more fixed costs. The results thus imply that institu-
tionally intense sectors suffered from the rise in transport costs; consistent with the idea that isolation
from international trade deteriorates institutions.
Capital intensitymay also determine the sectoral reallocationwhen trade costs change. Indeed, from
Heckscher-Ohlin theory, one would expect capital-intensive industries in this sample to flourish with
trade isolation: capital-abundant countries become more remote. The regression in column 2 controls
for the capital cost share. Its coefficient is positive but insignificant. The coefficient of the fixed cost
interaction hardly changes. That is not surprising, given that capital cost shares and fixed cost shares
have limited correlation in the agricultural sector (see Figure 1 in the Appendix). When clustering by
years instead of treatment spell, the standard error for the capital cost interaction is around 3 (significant
at the 1% level). In sum, the fixed cost interaction coefficient is unaffected by the capital cost interaction,
and that, if anything, capital-intensive sectors saw relatively higher exports in trade isolation.
The fixed effects structure controls for initial crop conditions and country-specific developments, but
not for the swings of agricultural prices on the world market. Column 3 reports a regression where the
country-crop conditions are substituted for crop-year specific fixed effects. That fixed effects structure
accounts for any global effects on the crop-level caused by the Suez canal closure. In this case, the
result on fixed cost shares are similar, if somewhat larger, and the effects on capital intensity larger and
significant. The regression with all potential fixed effects (country-year; country-crop; crop-year) gives
similar results: the coefficient of interest is -7.60 (with a p-value of 0.12 spell-clustered standard errors;
and a p-value of 0.01 under year-clustered standard errors). However, the large amount of fixed effects
renders convergence of the maximum likelihood more difficult.
Arguably, the transport cost shock occured twice: first when the Suez canal closed, and then when it
opened. To exploit the difference, columns 2 and 3 present the results of running the same regression in
a split sample, before 1971 and after 1971 (the middle of the treatment spell). The results remain similar:
the blocking of the canal and subsequent opening had effects of similar magnitude (less than a standard
error apart), the closing leading to shrinking of institutionally intensive industries, the opening leading
to an expansion of institutionally intensive industries. The capital intensity seems to play no role in
sectoral decline when the Suez canal closed; but there are discernible effects when the canal re-opened
(i.e., a relative decline of capital-intensive sectors). Another concern could be that before the Suez canal
re-opened in 1975, mines needed to be cleared from the canal before it became navigable. One might
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Figure 3: Predicted exports for different magnitudes of the cost shock, according to fixed cost share
(conditional on covariates)
argue that the opening of the Suez canal could be anticipated by one year (mine clearing started in
1974). In order to investigate this, I have rerun the specification allowing the spell to end in 1974 and
1973. The (unreported) regressions show no change in the results.
The interaction coefficient between transport costs and fixed cost shares could mask a positive in-
teraction effect on subsegments, because the model relies on the Poisson distribution. To check for such
non-linearities, I plot the predicted marginal means of exports by levels of the distance shock over dif-
ferent fixed cost shares (at average of the estimation sample). Figure 3 shows that larger increases in the
trade distance are associated with lower export flows. This effect is stronger conditional on higher fixed
cost share (the scale runs from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile). Together, there is no evidence
to suggest that the negative interaction coefficient covers any positive interaction effects.
3.4 Sensitivity
To rule out spurious explanations, I run a placebo regression, reported in column 6. It uses the same
sample and the same transport costs shock. However, the regression is run as if the shock hit between
1960 and 1963; relatively peaceful years for the Suez canal. As can be seen from column 3, artificially
dating the shock earlier in time leads to insignificant results, as expected. The coefficient is closer to zero
when running a placebo regression by assigning the shock to random years; and randomly assigning
the observed transport shocks across countries also leads to insignificant results.
Ideally, the trends of affected and unaffected countries should be similar before the shock to lend
credibility to the results. The placebo regression in Table 1 shows no divergent trends between crop
sensitivity between countries that would later be affected and those that would remain unaffected. To
check for trends in exports related to fixed cost intensity that differ before 1967 between affected and
unaffected countries, I run the exports regression containing the interaction between fixed costs shares
and eventual treatment. The results are reported in Appendix G; they show no diverging trends in the
difference between low and high fixed costs sectors across affected and unaffected countries.
Exports of goods that require large fixed costs could also drop more during the canal lockdown, if
such goods have a larger sensitivity to distance, or if they are exported disproportionately to Europe. To
check this, Appendix D considers bilateral export data of the same agricultural crops. Bilateral export
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data from the FAO date back to 1986 (the end of the baseline sample). I find no structural association
between the fixed cost share of a product and its distance sensitivity, nor that Europe imports such
goods disproportionately in general or from African countries. Finally, I check whether differences in
distance decay between products can explain the response to the Canal closure. I estimate the product-
specific distance decay parameters from the bilateral exports. Then I impute the percentage decrease
in export flows for each product following the Suez canal closure. Because the data before 1986 are not
bilateral, I impose that the decrease on all exports, to be conservative. Taking out the predicted export
reductions before running the above dif-in-dif regression yields similar results.
Governments’ responses to the freight cost shock might affect the estimated shock magnitude. If
governments selectively support sectors after a trade cost shock, sectoral exports patterns could be
mistakenly attributed to trade cost shock. If a government provides little support to sectors that are
hit worst by the transport shock, the above estimates could be exaggerated. In a subset of the sample,
price assistance data are available (see Appendix E for a further analysis). The change in assistance
measures shows no jump in 1967, but develops strongly in 1975 when the canal was reopened. I find
that governments support the sectors that are hit most severely, if there is a relation at all. The above
estimates therefore seem biased towards zero, if anything. Directly controlling for observed assistance
shows no change in results.
The identification in the above regression requires that up-front investment are sensitive to expro-
priation. In Appendix F, I consider this assumption in trade data from the same FAO source. However,
I look at later years, so the data can be joined with institutional indexes from the World Governance
Indicators. There is a positive correlation between the quality of "rule of law", and the average fixed
costs in exports for a country. I also report a gravity equation with fixed effects for the origin-year and
destination year; and fixed effects for the product-year. This rules out country-level explanations of in-
stitutional quality that can correlate with the country’s economic openness; and world market demand
shocks. The gravity equation shows that countries with higher institutional scores tend to export more
goods that require up-front investments.
Finally, the trade cost shock is not unique to Africa. In the Middle East and Central Asia, there is
another set of countries that has more than average exposure to the trade cost shock. Moving east from
the Suez canal along the coast, the group of countries with harbors on the Indian ocean and no obvious
land routes to Europe include: Yemen (main port Aden); Oman (Sultan Qaboos); Pakistan (Karachi);
India (Mumbai); Bangladesh (Chittagong); Myanmar (Thilawa) and Malaysia (Port Kelang). For these
countries, the average increase in shipping distance to Europe is 53%. However, unlike the African
sample, in the Asian geography, the ordering of countries in absolute change in seamiles and in relative
change in seamiles may not be the same: the extra seamiles in absolute terms is roughly equal between
India and Malaysia, but the relative impact is lower in Malaysia because its trade route to Europe is
longer. To avoid defining assumption on trade costs, I simply run the sectoral export regression with
a treatment dummy (equal to 1 between 1967 and 1975) interacted with sectoral fixed costs, and the
fixed effects structure as before. The interaction coefficient is -1.82***, implying that during the closure
of the Suez canal, if a sector has 10% higher fixed cost share, its exports declined 8% faster. This is
consistent with the earlier results. However, more caveats apply to this sample. There is no control
group of countries with unaffected sea routes so the coefficient is identified solely from variation over
time. Moreover, the alternative export destinations are less clear: Malaysia, for instance, may have
easier access to other markets like Japan or the U.S.
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3.5 Crop appropriability
Most theory of institutional change points to factor markets as the channel through which international
causes institutional change. However, another literature points to crop characteristics that determine
whether the crop is sensitive to institutional quality. The results above are intimately related to fac-
tor market processes. However, if institutions change, production may change because the output is
sensitive to institutions, too.
I follow the theory of Mayshar et al. (2015) in distinguishing between cereals and roots and tubers.
Roots and tubers like potato and cassave are high-calory substitutes for cereals in many parts of Africa.
However, tubers and roots cannot be stored - unlike cereals, they rot shortly after harvesting. As a
result, cereal crops are much easier to confiscate than tubers. Mayshar et al. go on to show that the local
relative productivity of cereals sparks a demand for social protection and generates hierarchy. For the
purpose of the current analysis, however, I only rely on the argument that cereals are more sensitive to
appropriability. Indeed, storage time explains large shares of the risk of theft (Fafchamps and Minten,
2001). The distinction of crops according to their sensitivity of theft, confiscation or other appropriation
is founded in anthropological literature too. That literature describes the social effects of crops and
food sources that provide immediate consumption versus those that come with delay between effort
and consumption (e.g. the front-back loaded model, Tushingham and Bettinger, 2013).
As an alternative check on the results, I examine the differential effects between cereal crops and
tubers. I use the same difference-in-difference approach, which examines whether cereal exports in-
creased relative to tubers for countries that saw isolation in international trade. Cereals in my sample
constitute rice, maize, wheat, barley, oats, rye, sorghum andmillet. Tubers and roots are potatoes, sweet
potatoes and cassave. I include the directly derived products (cake and bran) in these groups.
Table 2: Institutional sensitivity: Effects on log exports
PPML (1) (2)
PPML PPML j later sample






Cereal x Rule of Law 0.52**
(0.24)
Observations 1,500 4,884
country-year FE yes yes
country-product FE yes
destination-year FE NA yes
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2 shows the results of the regressions explaining crop exports for cereals versus tubers. The
dummy cereal is one for cereal crops and zero for roots and tubers (other crops are not in the sample).
The first column shows a negative coefficient for the interaction between the trade costs shock and
cereals, using the pseudo Poisson estimator. Consistent with earlier results, the more institutionally
intensive cereals see a drop in exports compared to tubers when trade costs increase. The coefficient
implies that during the shock, the average decline in cereal relative to tubers was around 19 percentage
points.
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The second column of Table 2 is a check on the institutional sensitivity of cereals relative to tubers
in international trade flows, like the regressions reported in Appendix F. It is a gravity model for
agricultural exports run on a sample of countries over the years 1995-2001, controlling for origin-year
and destination-year specific fixed effects. It shows that given the country-year effects, the exports of
cereals are high relative to tubers when the country has high levels of the indicator for rule of law. This
lends support to the argument that cereals are more institutionally intensive. In unreported regressions,
this result is confirmed for other institutional indicators. A positive correlation between distance of
trade and the cereal status could alternatively explain the result. However, running the same bilateral
gravity equation for 1986 data, like in the above sensitivity check (also detailed in Appendix D) shows
no evidence for that possibility.14
3.6 Evidence from manufacturing goods
The identifying assumption in the above regressions is that different agricultural products respond dif-
ferently to institutional changes due to differences in their production technology. However, a good’s
institutional sensitivity may surface in other characteristics. As Berkowitz et al. (2006) argues, insti-
tutionally poor environments might make it costlier to produce institution-intensive goods; but the
intensity may also be the result of product complexity.
To corroborate the evidence from agricultural exports, I present similar regressions based on dif-
ferent definitions of institutional dependence. Instead of using up-front investments as variation in
institutional sensitivity, I rely on the good’s type as classified by Rauch (1999) into differentiated and
homogenous (reference-priced or organized exchange). This primarily follows Ranjan and Lee (2007)
and Berkowitz et al. (2006), who both argue that a good’s degree of differentiation determines how in-
tensively it’s production relies on institutions. The idea is that homogenous goods are easily sold if a
trade partner cannot be held to his contractual obligations, and therefore run less risk when contract
enforcement is poor. Differentiated goods, which cannot easily be substituted and are often tailored
to the buyer, require larger relationship-specific investments, which have high exposure if contracts
fail. Both Ranjan and Lee and Berkowitz et al. show that good institutions are conducive to trade in
differentiated goods especially. I also follow Nunn (2007), who argues that the contractual intensity
of a good depends on the type of goods used as inputs: firms that need differentiated products from
upstream supplier rely more heavily on easy contract enforcement. Nunn similarly shows that institu-
tional quality works as a comparative advantage, as high indexes of institutional quality in a country
lead to relative specialization into firms that use differentiated inputs.
The export-to-world data for these regressions are from the COMTRADE database, based on an
SITC4 classification. These are matched with the Rauch classification, and the upstream product char-
acteristics from Nunn.15 The empirical strategy is the same as described in the previous subsection.
Table 3 present the results using product differentiation as a measure of the dependence on contract
enforcement. The negative coefficient of the interaction shows that when the distance shock took place,
firms that produced differentiated goods were particularly hit. The coefficient suggests that in affected
countries, the trade costs shock reduced exports in differentiated sectors around 23%more than in non-
differentiated sectors. The second column of Table 2 shows a regression for reference-priced goods, that
are least sensitive to institutional quality. It shows that these goods saw a relative upswing when trade
14A gravity equation with origin and destination fixed effects and an interaction for the dummy cereal and distance suggests
that cereals have no significantly different distance sensitivity, although the coefficient of the interaction (cereal X log distance) is
positive (0.42, p-value 0.29). Calculating the predicted differential export effect from the distance decay difference in the gravity
equation; and taking it out of the export flows in the original sample yields a slight attenuation of the coefficient of interest. The
coefficient reported in column 1 changes to -6.65*** when taking out distance-decay predicted effects of the canal closure; not
leading to qualitative changes in the conclusions.
15I use the crosswalk from James Markusen.
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Table 3: Differentiated products: effects on log exports
(1) (2) (3)
PPML PPML PPML
Shock log km x Differentiated -8.00*
(3.75)
Shock log km x Reference 5.17***
(1.92)
Shock log km x Inputs diff. -19.51***
(6.38)
Observations 4,765 4,765 3,899
country-year FE yes yes yes
crop-country FE yes yes yes
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
costs increased (the complementary group, goods sold on organized exchange, is argued to be between
the other two in terms of dependence on institutional context). Following the argumentation of Nunn
(2007), the third column considered an industry’s dependence on differentiated inputs, rather than its
final product. Whether the firm produces differentiated goods or uses differentiated goods as inputs
does not seem tomatter much: either way, dealingwith differentiated goods led to stronger contractions
when the Suez canal closed. The coefficient implies that a sector’s trade decline was on average 10%
stronger relative to its unaffected counterpart, if those sectors have 17% (one sample standard deviation)
more differentiated inputs.
4 Conclusions
This paper exploits the closing of the Suez canal (Feyrer, 2009) to assess how international trade affects
institutions. Theory suggests that there may be opposing effects on institutions when countries liber-
alize international trade. On the one hand, trade may lead to specialization in comparative advantage
industries. In developing countries, such specialization can expand industries that demand poor prop-
erty rights and contract enforcement. On the other hand, increased access to the world market pushes
all firms to demand productivity-conducive institutions: easier participation in the world economy
implies that the high factor prices associated with expropriation cause large losses of sales.
The empirical results show that when the Suez canal closed, African countries behind the Suez canal
saw a fall in institutionally intensive production. This sectoral pattern suggests that international trade
contributed to local institutions, rather than eroded them. The result controls for confounding country-
specific developments and holds across different definitions of institutional sensitivity.
The evidence in this paper complements earlier methodologies to identify a causal relation of trade.
The closing of the Suez canal was not influenced nor anticipated by the countries in the sample, making
it a "quasi-experiment" for a substantial shock to trade costs. The quasi-experiment helps to interpret
causal effect of trade on institutions, adding to earlier results using instrumental variable approaches
and dif-in-dif approaches.
The sectoral focus of the paper joint with the African setting allows an accurate evaluation of the "in-
stitutional comparative advantage" argument against international trade. According to that argument,
institutionally poorly developed countries specialize further into institutionally malevolent industries
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when opening up to trade (formulated in Levchenko, 2007, and ensuing literature). Eastern African
countries in the 1960s and 1970s were institutionally disadvantaged compared to the European coun-
tries from which they were cut off. While the context of the sample obviously confines the generaliz-
ability of the results, the sample seems one of the more plausible candidates for "adverse institutional
specialization" to occur.
It is not obvious whether poor institutions affect goods markets or factor markets. Empirically, this
paper takes no stance - institutional measures based on production factors, on products or on inputs
yield qualitatively similar results. That is not surprising, as a country’s different measures of institu-
tional quality are often correlated. Theoretically, this paper offers one theoretical argument for institu-
tional change through factor transactions. Related literature also points to land tenure institutions (Field
et al., 2006), particularly in crop selection (e.g. Deininger and Jin, 2006; Smith, 2004; Markus Goldstein,
2008).
In the debate on "aid for trade", my results support the idea that trade can improve institutions.
Yet, they are not evidence of overall effectiveness of those policies. Nor is this paper evidence for
economic growth effects, suggested by a literature on crop and nutrition choices and their effects on
social interaction and development (Demsetz, 1967; Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; Tushingham and
Bettinger, 2013; Mayshar et al., 2015). That conclusion takes more steps - that aid increases trade; and
that trade activates the specific institutions that foster economic growth (see, e.g. Cadot et al., 2014;
Hühne et al., 2014).
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A Analytical Appendix
A.1 Trade liberalization, sectoral expansion and factor prices
First, I define the comparative advantange sector of a country to be the sector that intensively uses
the factor with a low relative price in the country. I assume technology to be the same in the home
country and the rest of the world. From the definition of the sector-specific inputs and its produc-







Y. The price (marginal costs) relative to the world price of z deter-




The number of firms increases in the sectoral revenue. Under an isoelastic demand function, firms
charge a constant markup. The markup implies that a share 1/σ of revenue is operating profit. Under
the zero-profit condition (ZPC), operating profits need to cover the fixed costs. Firm-level revenue (and
thus operating profits) fall in the number of firms that employ the sector-specific input, because fiercer





/σ = φrk f +ω. (15)
As the right-hand side of this equation is unaffected by the number of firms, the left-hand side implies
that when sectoral revenue increases, the number of firms in the sector rises. The model thus exhibits
an Heckscher-Ohlin result: trade liberalization causes sectors that uses the relatively cheap sector inten-
sively to expand.
Wages and rents also change with trade liberalization. By Shepard’s lemma, the change in capital







In a zero-profit equilibrium, total costs equal total revenue (less contributions) and I assume that the
cost function is twice differentiable. Given the sectoral revenue responses to trade liberalization, the
lemma suggests that factor demand expands for intensive factor of comparative industries. With fixed
factor supply, the prices of the factor intensively used in comparative industries thus rise. Note that
it is not necessarily appropriate to talk of relative scarcity: theoretically, countries may have a relative
abundance of capital, but a comparative disadvantage in capital-intensive industries because of poor
institutions.
Trade liberalization this follows both Ricardian andHeckscher-Ohlin type forces. It is not possible to
say ex ante what the net effect on factor prices and sectoral expansion is. A labor abundant country may
have Ricardian advantages (i.e. high Ez) in industries that are capital intensive; potentially offsetting
Hecksher-Ohlin motives.
A.2 The effect of trade liberalization on political contributions.
The total contributions are given byΩ =∑
z
nzωz; the equilibrium violation of social welfare due to poor
insitutions is determined by dΩ/dφ. My interest is in how trade costs change themarginal contributions
for poor institutions, i.e.: d
2Ω
dφdτ .
















First, it is possible to eliminate the second term, dnz/dφ. Firms enter until profits are driven to zero. I






Using the envelope condition, the term ∂pii/∂φ (ignoring effects on factor inputs) is the first-order con-
dition on optimality of the bribe, and so must be zero. In equilibrium, a deterioration of property rights
has marginally no effect on firm entry, because it does not affect firm profitability.















The effect of trade cost changes requires understanding the sectoral changes (dnz/dτ); the equilibrium
level of sectoral contributions (dωz/dφ); and firms’ change in willingness to bribe d2ωz/dφ/dτ. I will
discuss the terms in turn.
Changes in the number of firms are determined by how profits are affected. To determine dnz/dτ, I
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The sectoral expansion after trade liberalization closely follows the sectoral profit changes of trade lib-
eralization. Since ∂pii/∂nz < 0 by the free entry condition, the sectoral expansion takes the sign of the
numerator. The numerator suggests that industries expand if their firms have i) large revenues ex ante
and ii) intensively use factors that see lower factor price rises (i.e. if the marginal costs fall).
If the policymaker change the quality of institutions, the change in expected contribution from each
firm is given by how the profits of each firm change:
dω
dφ






This term collects the two opposing direct effects of poorer contract enforcement on the profit function:
they increase marginal costs and reduce sales (first term), but also decrease the total costs because larger
shares of capital are retained (second term). There are no effects on the sectoral input prices (ρ) because
entry does not change following (18).
Finally, the last term in (19) requires understanding how the above dω/dφ changes in trade costs.

















The second step assumes that changes in the equilibrium return on capital due to institutional changes
and due to trade costs changes are log-separable. The model has no discussion of how the outside
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option for the capital supplier is decided - it is not clear how trade costs change the trade-off between
the contract with the firm and the outside option. Taking the fixed capital share and ratio between
equilibrium and outside options returns as constants with respect to trade costs, the total capital costs











If the effects of trade costs and institutions on equilibrium capital returns are log separable, then d dr
(φ)/dφ
r(φ) /dτ =
0. In that case, the total capital costs changes in trade costs are capital by dTKCidφ nz
dk/dτ















This step, along with equations (19), (20) and (21) gives the policy-maker’s first-order condition (11)
discussed in the text.
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B Figures
Figure 4: Shipping distance calculator from searates.com
Figure 5: Capital cost share and variable input cost share for different industries
C Countries in the sample and their main ports
Angola (Luanda); Cameroon (Douala); Congo (PointeNoire); Democratic Republic of the Congo (Matadi);
Djibouti (Djibouti); Equatorial Guinea (Bata); Eritrea (Assab); Ethiopia PDR (Djibouti); Gabon (Libre-
ville); Kenya (Mombasa); Madagascar (Toamasina); Mozambique (Beira); Namibia (Walvis Bay); Nige-
ria; Somalia (Mogadishu); South Africa (Durban); Sudan (former) (Port Sudan); United Republic of
Tanzania (Dar Es Salaam).
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D Distance decay and fixed costs
In the above results, the higher sensitivity to trade isolation of sectors with higher fixed costs is inter-
preted as a symptom of deteriorating institutions. That interpretation would be invalid, if product with
higher fixed costs have structurally different trade costs, or if they are exported more to the destinations
that experience a shock.
The regressions in Table 4 show no evidence of such distortions. The first column exploit bilateral
trade data from 1986 (the first available year). The dependent variable is the mean distance shipped of
an export crop from a specific country (the export distance weighted by the size of exports). Conditional
on the origin fixed effects, fixed cost shares embodied in the agricultural products do not predict export
distance in this sample.
Table 4: Fixed costs, distance and destinations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Distance Log Export Log Export Log Export Log Export Log Exporta
Sample World World African World African Main sample
exporters exporters
Fixed cost share -894.36
(1282.03)
log Distance -0.99*** -0.88 -0.46*** 0.43
(0.35) (0.99) (0.06) (0.46)
Fixed cost share x log Distance 0.89 2.53
(0.72) (2.57)
Fixed cost share x shock log km -6.99*
(3.62)
Capital cost share x shock log km 17.05
(11.91)
Fixed cost share x Europe -0.58 1.44
(1.35) (3.80)
Observations 578 14,731 372 14,731 372 4,422
Origin FE yes yes yes yes yes
Destination FE yes yes yes yes
Crop FE yes yes yes yes
Country-year FE yes
Country-crop FE yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. αExport cleared from prediction (see text)
The second and third column in Table 4 allow distance decay conditional on fixed cost shares of the
exports. The interaction of fixed costs shares is insignificant, suggesting that the distance decay in the
1986 agricultural exports is not systematically associated with the fixed costs embodied in the products.
This holds for the global sample (column 2), as well as for the subsample of African exports (column 3).
The second and third column in Table 4 test whether exports to Europe represent significantly higher
fixed costs, by interacting fixed cost shares with a dummy for export flow destined to Europe. Europe
does not import agricultural goods that rely more on fixed costs, both from the world, and from African
countries.
The last column in Table 4 runs the original dif-in-dif regression, with a modification for expected
export changes from the distance shock. The modification consists of two steps. First, I estimate the
specific distance decay for every product in the bilateral trade dataset. It is a standard gravity equa-
tion, explaing log exports from log population-weighted distance and borders using importer and ex-
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Figure 6: Share of the country-crop pairs that experienced a changing assistance pattern by year
porter fixed effects. Based on the percentage trade distance shock from the Suez canal closure, I predict
the change in exports for every product for all affected countries - these are predictions based on the
distance-sensitivty of the product. In the second step, I take export changes predicted by the distance
decay out of the observed export flows, before running the original dif-in-dif model. The assumption
here is that the model now examines export variation after the trade cost shock above and beyond what
would be expected based on the sensitivity to distance of each product. The results are reported in col-
umn 6. They suggest that the interaction between fixed cost shares and the trade cost shock is slightly
less clear (from -8.45*** to -6.99***, around 20% decrease in magnitude) but the qualitative conclusions
are similar.
E Price assistance
Many African countries in the 1960s and 1970s supported agricultural production by pricing instru-
ments. The effective support by product is available for a subset of the data in the paper. For the
crop classification used in the main results, there are observations on price assistance on the coun-
tries Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Tanzania (Anderson and Valenzuela,
2013). These allow a comparison of changes in price assistance to changes in export patterns.
To examine overall changes in the assistance patterns, I examine how often they change. Figure 6
tracks the changes in nominal assistance rates. Nominal rates of assistance are the effective estimated
price supports in percentage terms. The Figure shows for what share of all crops in all countries in the
sample, price assistance rates changed. There is an upward trend: in the 1960s, on average, one in five
sectors (in a given country) saw changes in assistance, but that number has risen towards 80 percent in
the 1980. There is no clear change in the years around the closure of the Suez canal, but the number of
changes triples around the re-opening of the Suez canal.
Table 5 presents further analysis of the nominal assistance rates. The first column considers how the
trade cost shock affects assistance rates according to fixed cost shares. It suggests that during the clo-
sure of the Suez canal, sectors with higher fixed cost shares received no lower or higher price assistance.
Column 2 reports a regression focusing on a time-span two years before and after the closure. It sug-
gests that at the start of the closure, assistance was higher for industries with higher fixed cost shares.
This suggests the results from Table 1 may be understated, the sectors in decline received stronger gov-
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ernment support. At the re-opening of the Suez canal, Figure 6 shows a marked increase in changes in
the assistance rates. Column 3, however, suggests those changes are not correlated to fixed costs shares.
Columns 4 to 6 report the baseline regressions on the sample for which price assistance rates are
observed. It is consistent with earlier results, but shows large sample selection. Introducing price
assistance as a control confirms earlier results, if significantly larger than in the original sample. This
is not due to the introduction of the price assistance control: running the baseline regression on the
same sample (column 5) shows that the estimate is almost unaltered. The same holds when introducing
capital cost shares.
Table 5: Nominal rates of assistance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assistance Assistance Assistance Export Export Export
OLS OLS OLS PPML PPML PPML
65 to 69 73 to 77
Rate of assistance -0.46 -0.46
(0.66) (0.66)
Fixed cost share x shock log km 0.86 1.56*** 0.52 -78.91*** -77.52*** -79.28***
(0.91) (0.00) (0.84) (24.06) (23.60) (24.44)
Capital cost share x shock log km -1.31
(46.84)
Observations 1,338 138 223 989 989 989
country-year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
crop-country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The second column shows that controlling for the observed assistance changes does not affect the
main result - the shock has a larger negative impact on sectors that face higher fixed costs. The coeffi-
cients are identified from a much smaller sample than the sample in the main text. To benchmark the
coefficient, I estimate the baseline regression in the sample for which assistance is observed, in column
3. The results show that the coefficient is negative, and that controlling for assistance attentuates the
estimate of the fixed costs effect in the export decline by around 10%. Overall, the coefficients repre-
sent much larger effects, however. The sample for which price support is recorded does not seem to be
representative for the larger sample.
Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the same regression results, but with the interaction between a sector’s
capital share and the trade costs shock included. Controlling for the capital cost shares again does not
change the results much. When explaining the level of assistance, introducing the trade cost interac-
tion with capital cost share reduces the coefficient of the fixed cost share and trade costs interaction
by around 60%, suggesting that capital intensity may pose a stronger motive for price support. In
unreported regressions, I used border market price supports instead of general price supports. The
correlation between the measures is very high (0.97) and the result show no change.
F Institutional sensitivity by crop
An important identifying assumption drawn from the theory is that fixed costs pose barriers if insti-
tutions are poor. Because there is little measurement of institutional quality in African countries in
the 1960s, it is hard to confirm the correlation between fixed costs and institutions directly. Yet, it is
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desirable to verify whether fixed costs indeed pose institutional barriers.
To check whether fixed costs are indeed more of a barrier in institutionally poor countries, I check
the predictions in a sample with more information on institutions. I compare the FAO trade data to
the institutional indexes of the the Worldwide Governance Indicators by the World Bank. The "Rule
of Law" variable is a widely used measure of institutional quality and seems applicable in the context
of my theoy: it comprises the enforcement of contracts and property rights, the quality of police and
courts, and the likelihood of crime. I match the indicator with bilateral trade data from the FAO that
follows the same product classification as the data used earlier. The overlap produces a dataset of 156
countries over the years 1996-2011.
Figure 7: Rule of Law and the average fixed costs involved in exports
Figure 7 scatters the Rule of Law indicator and the fixed costs involved in exports. The fixed costs
are calculated as the export-weighted fixed cost share for each country in each year. The data confirm
that countries with higher institutional scores have higher average fixed costs shares in exports. A
one standard deviation increase in the Rule of Law score is associated with higher fixed cost shares in
exports of around a third of the sample standard deviation (significant beyond the third decimal).
The association between institutional indicators and exports’ fixed costs shares may be driven by
confounders, however. To exclude that country- and product-level variables explain the association, I
also estimate a gravity equation. The gravity equation uses bilateral product-level data from the FAO -
the data of the above scatterplot in their bilateral version. To control for any effects at the product-level
and the country-level, I introduce product-year and origin and destination country-year fixed effects.16
Table 6 present the results from estimating the gravity in the larger sample. The first column shows
coefficients consistent with most other estimated gravity equations: an estimated distance elasticity
around minus unity and significant border effects. In column 2, there is an interaction between the
institutional index (Rule of Law) of the origin country and the fixed costs share involved in the produc-
tion being exported. The individual arguments of this interaction are absorbed by the fixed effect: the
institutional indicator by the origin-year fixed effect and the fixed costs share by the product-year fixed
effect. Thus, the interaction suggests that conditional on any country and product level characteristics,
fixed costs intensive products are exported more often from institutionally advanced countries.
Further regressions confirm the result that fixed-costs intensive industries rely on institutions. To
exclude capital sensitivity as an explanation, column 2 shows the interaction between capital shares
16This is the most conservative fixed effects strategy. Restricting to time-invariant fixed effects or dropping product-specific
fixed effects gives the same results.
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and institutional quality in addition to the fixed costs share interaction. Conforming to intuition, better
institutions foster capital intense exports. Importantly, this does not affect the estimated effects of fixed
costs qualitatively. That adding capital intensity does not change the results regarding fixed costs is no
surprise, as fixed costs share and capital intensity show no strong correlation. The last columns repeat
the analysis for the other institutional indexes from the World Governance Indicators, each confirming
the earlier result.
Table 6: Institutional sensitivity: Effects on log exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RL RL CC GE PV RQ VA
Distance (log) -0.85*** -0.85*** -0.87*** -0.87*** -0.87*** -0.87*** -0.87*** -0.86***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Border 0.80*** 0.81*** 0.82*** 0.81*** 0.82*** 0.81*** 0.81*** 0.81***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Fixed x RoL 1.10*** 1.44*** 1.37*** 1.61*** 2.27*** 1.53*** 1.65***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Cap. x RoL 8.79*** 8.32*** 8.37*** 10.44*** 8.90*** 8.33***
(0.19) (0.17) (0.20) (0.22) (0.22) (0.20)
Observations 243,228 243,228 243,228 243,228 243,228 243,212 243,228 243,228
Origin-year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination-year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Indicator codes: RL: Rule of Law; CC: Control of Corruption; GE: Government Effectiveness
PV: Political Stability and Absence of Violence; RQ: Regulatory Quality; VA: Voice and Accountability
G Pre-shock export differences for high fixed costs share sectors
Estimates of divergence before the trade cost shock are obtained by running the regression: logexportsict =
µct+µic+∑
t
βtDtreatDyearfixed cost share+uict where µ indicates amultiplicative fixed effects along
time (t), country (c) or crop (i) dimensions. Dtreat denotes a country that is eventually affected by the
trade cost shock. The coeffient βt captures, for year t, the additional sensitivity of exports to a higher
sectoral fixed cost share in pre-affected countries. Figure 8 reports the estimates for βt in different years
before the shock.
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Figure 8: Effect of having a higher fixed cost share on exports in affected vs unaffected countries before
the Suez canal closure
H Products by category
Category (USDA) Product
Barley Barley; Barley (pearled)
Corn Sweet corn (frozen); Sweet corn (preserved); Flour (maize); Maize; Oil, maize;
Cake, maize
Cotton Cotton lint; Cotton waste; Cottonseed; Cotton, carded, combed; Oil, cottonseed;
Cake, cottonseed
Cow/Beef Butter (cow milk); Cheese (whole cow milk); Milk, skimmed cow; Milk, whole
fresh cow; Skins, calve; Meat beef preparations; Meat, cattle boneless (beef and
veal)
Hogs Meat, pig; Meat, pig sausages; Meat, pig, preparations; Meat, pork
Rice Rice – total (Rice milled equivalent); Bran, rice
Sorghum Sorghum; Flour, mixed grain; Grain, mixed
Soybeans Oil, soybean; Soya sauce; Soybeans; Cake, soybeans
Sugar Sugar beet; Sugar Raw Centrifugal; Sugar refined; Sugar, nes
Tobacco Tobacco, unmanufactured; Tobacco products nes
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